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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK GRANATO, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
GRAND JURY, et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 14425 
WAHLQUIST, District Judge 
The appellant was the Chairman of the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission. The Salt Lake County Grand Jury 
indicted him on two counts of requesting bribes and two counts 
of receiving bribes, all allegedly to affect zoning matters. 
He was taken into custody, on the warrants, and released on 
his own promise to appear. 
The complete criminal file is not before this court, 
but the briefs of the parties concede that the District Court 
conducting the criminal proceeding refused to review the ver-
batim transcript of the witnesses on which the Grand Jury 
apparently relied upon in returning the indictment. In effect 
he has refused to review the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the indictment. The criminal court also refused to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-2-
order a preliminary hearing. The same court apparently 
disappointed the appellant herein by limiting the bill of 
particulars and the appellantfs right to discovery. The 
judge cited State v. Faux, a 1959 case (9 Utah 2d 350, 345 
Pacific 2d 186) and permitted the defense counsel to examine 
the testimony of witnesses on the indictment, but prohibited 
the copying of the testimony and denied other requests. 
The appellant immediately filed this civil complaint in the 
nature of a writ of habeas corpus. He alleges that his 
freedom is constructively restrained by the defendants because: 
Ml. The indictment in Criminal No. 
28220 against the appellant was issued 
without sufficient probable cause. 
n2. The appellant was denied verbatim 
copies of transcripts of testimony of any 
and all witnesses who appeared before the 
grand jury relative to the indictment. 
113. The appellant was denied the 
names, addresses, and telephone numbers 
of all persons interviewed by the grand 
jury to determine both inculpatory and 
exculpatory evidence. 
"4. The appellant was denied taking 
depositions of all persons deemed necessary 
for adequate preparation of his defense to 
the indictment. 
f,5. The appellant was denied a pre-
liminary examination before trial on the 
indictment.11 
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The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint. 
They assert that it does not state a cause of action upon 
which relief can be granted* The District Court (the same 
judge hearing the criminal matter) granted the motion to 
dismiss, but then apparently made an order in the criminal 
case suspending the proceedings until the appeal from his 
order in the civil matter was decided. 
The named defendants in this civil proceeding are: 
first the 1975 Salt Lake County Grand Jury, second the Foreman 
thereof and the individual members, third some John Does 1 
through 10 who have never been served or appeared. 
The individual grand jurors, either individually or 
as a group, had no right nor power to make any disclosure of 
the testimony before it without a court order. Grand jury 
members as such have no power or obligation to account to 
individuals indicted for the logic of their action. The 
grand jurors have no power to either grant or free this appel-
lant from the constructive restraints present on him. It is 
abundantly clear that the defendants herein named, either 
1. Utah Code Annotated § 77-19-10 and § 77-19-9 (1953), 
as amended. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-4-
individually or as a ffGrand Jury11, are without the power 
to grant any of the relief here prayed for without an express 
court order; and no such express court order is alleged/ The 
District Court therefore was justified in dismissing the 
complaint. 
There is another compelling reason that the dis-
missal of the complaint was proper. Setting aside the obvious 
fact that the named defendants were powerless to grant the 
relief requested and assuming that a party witlj such power 
had been named a defendant, then the issue appears "Should 
the writ of habeas corpus have been granted?" The Court 
holds that it should not. 
This Court has held many times that the extra-
ordinary writ of habeas corpus cannot be used in effect as 
a substitute for the orderly processes of appeal.2 What is 
requested in this case is in effect an intermediate appeal. 
If this writ were granted, it would have the effect of 
placing the criminal division of the District Court under 
the supervision of the civil division of the District Court 
via the surreptitious route of writ of habeas corpus. The 
2. Bryant v. Turner, 19 U. 2d 284, 431 P. 2d 121. 
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development of such a procedure would be highly undesirable. 
This proceeding has in effect caused the delay of the criminal 
proceeding for over six months. If the Supreme Court deemed 
this a proper case to hear an intermediate appeal, it could 
3 
grant such an appeal; but to permit such a power to rest in 
the civil division of the District Court would cause an 
unnecessary complication in the process of criminal pro-
ceedings. The District Court was therefor justified in 
dismissing this application for release as an improper effort 
to substitute the extraordinary writ for the intermediate 
appeal. 
In order for this Court to reach the issues requested 
to be determined by the appellant herein, the Court would not 
only have to ignore the obvious error in the naming of defen-
dants, but would also have to ignore the unjustified attempt 
to develop a new form of intermediate appeal and then proceed 
to meet the purported issues head on. The Court refuses to 
do so in this case. Insofar as the civil complaint is a 
justification for the delay of the criminal proceedings, it 
no longer exists. 
3. Rule 72 (b) URCP. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-6-
The order dismissing the complaint is affirmed• 
The individual members of the grand jury named as defendants 
are awarded their costs, if any, herein. 
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